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In this study we have tried to answer the questions of whether 
and how it is possible to explain differences in effects of 
"crowding out" between segments of the labor market and 
between the men and women within those segments. Crowding out 
is defined as a situation in which highly educated employees 
get jobs that were held by lower educated employees. There are 
several important reasons to pose these questions. First, 
there are contradictions in current research about effects of 
crowding out. Even when the same data are used, researchers 
have arrived at different contradictory conclusions. These 
contradictions primarily result from differences in theories 
that are used and models that are tested. Second, the well-
documented differences in the allocation of employees over 
jobs between segments of the labor market is also likely to 
cause differences in effects of crowding out between segments, 
and little attention has been paid to this possibility. 
Finally, the well-documented differences in the allocation of 
men and women to jobs and segments is also likely to cause 
differences in effects of crowding out on men and women. 
 A problem in evaluating and comparing existing research is 
caused by the different models and theories of the functioning 
of the labor market. Therefore the different models and 
theories that are most frequently used to explain effects of 
crowding out are compared in chapter 2. The theories and 
models mentioned are: the human capital theory, the job 
competition model, the hedonic theory of wages, the screening 
hypothesis, the credentialist theory, the theory of segmented 
labor markets, efficiency wage models and a recent search 
model developed by Teulings. 
 Next we examine the ability of each of these models and 
theories to explain effects of crowding out. These comparisons 
show that effects of crowding out can be explained when three 
assumptions are made. The first assumption is that 
unemployment must exist. The second necessary assumption is 
that downwardly rigid wages must exist that is, despite of an 
excess of supply of labor, wages do not fall. If wages are 
flexible (that is they react to changes in supply and /or 
demand) changes in allocation will not necessarily lead to 
crowding out. The third necessary assumption is that both 
supply and demand of labor must be heterogeneous. 
  Then, we examine the ability of these models and theories 
to explain differences in the labor market positions between 
men and women. Only some models and theories can explain these 
differences when specific assumptions are made about 
differences between men and women. Other models and theories 
can not explain these differences at all. 
 The most common assumption used to explain differences in 
the labor market position of men and women is discontinuity in 
women's labor market participation. Because women interrupt 
their labor market career more often than men, women either 
are thought to invest less in human capital than men (human 
capital theory) or they are placed behind men in the labor 
queue because of lower returns on job training costs (job 
competition model). Another assumption is that there are 
differences in the productivity of men and women (with men 
more productive than women), which makes it cheaper for 
employers to hire men instead of women. The ad hoc character 
of these assumptions is problematic. They are based on 
empirical evidence of earlier research and are not theory 
based. 
 
In chapter 2 we examine also several models and theories 
specifically developed to explain differences in labor market 
positions of men and women. These are Becker's theory of `a 
taste for discrimination', theories based on differences in 
economic power between several actors, and the crowding 
hypothesis. 
 Explanations developed on basis of Becker's research are 
not helpful in explaining differences in the labor market 
positions of men and women. Because of competition differences 
either disappear, or the labor market becomes completely 
segregated (where employers hire only men or only women). In 
the latter case wage differences between men and women are not 
necessary. 
 Explanations based on differences in economic power are 
also not helpful in explaining differences between men and 
women. Monopolists have no reason at all to differentiate 
between men and women, and monopsonists should pay women 
higher wages than men given the empirical differences in 
elasticities of labor supply between men and women. Besides 
monopsonists hardly exist. 
 The crowding hypothesis is unable to explain the lack of 
"women's" occupations. Further it remains unclear why the 
ratio between demand and supply is less favorable for women 
than men.  
 
On basis of these results we then decided to develop an 
efficiency wage model of the labor market as the starting 
point of our explanation. In these models, the productivity of 
employees is dependent on wage rates. Because of this 
dependency, wage rates are downwardly rigid. If wages fall too 
much, productivity falls even more, and employers see falls in 
their profits, despite lower wages. Downwardly rigid wage 
rates make it possible to explain effects of crowding out, and 
with some additional assumptions, it is also possible to 
explain differences in labor market positions of men and 
women. These additional assumptions are derived from a 
adjusted version of Becker's household production functions 
which he introduced in 1965. 
 
In chapter 3 we elaborate a model of the labor market that 
explains allocation, effects of crowding out and differences 
in labor market positions of men and women. The model is based 
upon relationships between employers and employees. These 
relations can be one of two kinds: relationships of trust or 
relationships of control. The kind of relation that develops 
depends on the difficulties employers have in measuring the 
productivity of their employees. If employers have difficulty 
measuring the productivity of the employees (the price of 
control is high) employers can maximize their profits by 
trusting their employees and by paying them relatively high 
wages. If employers can measure the productivity of their 
employees easily (the price of control is low) employers can 
maximize their profits instead by controlling their employees 
and by paying them relatively low wages. These facts lead to 
an efficiency wage model in which efficiency wages depend 
directly on the price of control, the amount of control, the 
level of effort of an employee, and the productive 
characteristics of employees. 





Because employers with the highest price of control pay the 
highest wages and trust employees and because employees 
with the highest levels of education have the lowest costs 
per unit product, we expect to find employees with high 
levels of education to be employed more often by employers 
with a high price of control than by employers with a low 
price of control. 
 
 
This allocation model of the labor market is able to explain 
effects of crowding out. The necessary assumptions are 
fulfilled: both supply and demand of labor are heterogeneous, 
and wages cannot fall below a certain level, even when there 
is an abundance of labor supply. In these conditions, 
employers are better able to meet their preferences for higher 
educated employees. The probability of finding a job will 
especially fall for employees with the lowest levels of 
education. Because employers with a high price of control pay 
the highest wages they are especially able to hire the most 




The effects of crowding out will appear sooner and stronger 
for employers with a high price of control than for 
employers with a low price of control. 
 
 
To explain differences between men and women in allocation in 
the labor market it is necessary to make several assumptions 
about the restrictions that men and women face. As a result 
the utility function of employees is modified. Instead, more 
general goals were formulated, arguments that move beyond 
wages and level of effort as explanations for the utility 
function These goals include: physical well being and social 
approval. In addition the composition of households is taken 
into account. Here, a distinction is made between (a) 
households consisting of one member, and (b) households 
consisting of two or more members. The following hypothesis is 
formulated on basis of maximizing physical well being and 
accounting for comparative advantages of men in providing the 




Married men hold better positions in the labor market than 
non-married men, and women who in their turn hold better 
positions than married women. 
 
 
The combination of hypothesis 3a with the allocation model 




The differences in labor market positions hold by married men, 
non-married men, non-married women and married women are 
largest among employers with a high price of control than 
among employers with a low price of control. 
 
 
The maximization of social approval -- which consists of 
status, behavioral confirmation and affection -- produces a 
difference in labor market behavior of married women with high 
educational levels and those with low educational levels. 
Highly educated married women attach relatively more 
importance to aspects of job status than married women with 





Highly educated women who are married to highly educated men 
attach relatively more importance to job status than to 
wages. Highly educated women married to men with lower 
educational levels attach relatively more importance to 
wages than to job status, as do non-married women and 
married women with low levels of education. 
 
 





The effects of crowding out will be stronger among men 
employed by employers with a high price of control, and 
non-married men will suffer more from crowding out than 
married men. Women, especially highly educated women 




In chapter 4 the datasets, methods, and variables used in this 
research are described. 
 The datasets that are used in this research are the 1981 
and 1985 Labor Force Censuses. Only persons who held a paid 
job or worked as a member of a family organization are 
included in these analyses. The 1981 dataset contains 24686 
persons, and the 1985 dataset contains 25572 persons. For 
detailed descriptions of the Labor Force Censuses, see CBS 
(1985a) and CBS (1987). 
 Two statistical methods are used to test the hypotheses. 
First, a multinomial logit model is used to estimate the 
allocation of employees over employers. A multinomial logit 
model estimates the probability of employees to work in one of 
the labor market segments, after taking some of their 
characteristics into account. Second a logit "continuation 
ratio" model is used to estimate the allocation of employees 
over job levels within the distinguished labor market 
segments. A logit continuation ratio model estimates the 
probability of employees to achieve a certain job level, again 
after accounting for several employee characteristics and the 
labor market segment. Together these two models give the 
allocation of employees over all jobs. By comparing estimates 
at two separate moments in time it is possible to speculate 
about changes in the allocation of employees among employers. 
An extensive example is given in chapter 4. By analyzing the 
allocation of men and women separately, it is possible to draw 
conclusions about the differences in allocation between men 
and women. 
 Section 4 describes the variables and the coding of the 
variables that are used in the analyses. Detailed attention is 
paid to the coding of jobs into job levels, and to the coding 
of firms into segments of the labor market. These two 
variables are the focal points of the research. For the coding 
of jobs into job levels we use the scheme of Conen and Huijgen 
(1980a). For the coding of job levels three criteria are used. 
First, time necessary for on-the-job training, second, level 
of independence, and third level of necessary schooling. 
 For the coding of segments of the labor market we use the 
scheme of Stinchcombe (1979). On the basis of limitations in 
competition in both the product market and the labor market 
Stinchcombe developed seven segments. On the basis of the 
possibility of control over labor relations, assumptions are 
made about the price of control. A categorization of the labor 
market into seven segments results with each segment differing 
by price of control. The other variables used in the analyses 
are educational level, type of education, age, marital state, 
sex and firm size. 
 
In chapter 5 hypothesis 1 is tested in two different ways. 
First we estimate a multinomial logit model in which the 
probability to work in one of the seven labor market segments 
is used as the dependent variable. Several productive 
characteristics are entered into the model: educational level, 
type of education and age of the employees. In addition we 
control for non-married men, married men, non-married women, 
married women and firm size. The analysis shows that employees 
with a high educational level have the highest probability of 
working within professional services, which is also the 
segment with the highest price of control. Employees with the 
high educational levels have the lowest probability of working 
within segments with a low price of control, segments like 
'classical' capitalistic industries and small competitive 
trade and services. 
 Employees with technical types of education have the 
highest probability of working within industrial segments, 
while employees with administrative types of education have a 
higher probability of working within bureaucratic services, 
and small competitive trade and services. Employees with 
'caring' types of education have a higher probability of 
working within the professional services. 
 Age, although significant, has little effect on the 
probability of working within a particular labor market 
segment. 
 These results support hypothesis 1. Therefore we can 
conclude that employees who are relatively productive have a 
higher probability of working with employers who have a high 
price of control than of working with employers who have a low 
price of control. 
 
Second, a logit continuation ratio model for each of the seven 
segments is fitted. In this model the dependent variable is 
the probability of achieving a higher job level. Several 
characteristics of employees are entered into the model: 
educational level, type of education, age and age squared. In 
addition we control for marital state, sex, and firm size.  
 The analysis shows that the association between educational 
level and job level is strongest for the professional services 
and weakest for small competitive trade and services. In 
general this association is stronger for segments that have a 
high price of control than for segments that have a low price 
of control. The results from the 1981 labor force census are 
more in line with hypothesis 1 than the results from the 1985 
labor force census. 
 Where the type of education is concerned, the results are 
in line with the idea that for the segments where the demand 
for some type of education was high these types of education 
provide the highest probability of achieving a high job level 
within these segments. The only exceptions are the probability 
of achieving a high job level within bureaucratic services 
with a technical education and within 'classical' capitalistic 
industries with an administrative education. Both 
probabilities are higher than expected. 
 Even though the effects of age and age squared are 
significant within virtually every segment, the differences in 
effects of age and age squared between the segments are not 
straightforward. In 1981 there are few differences and in 1985 
the differences do not support our expectations. 
 The results with respect to educational level, type of 
education, age and age squared, support hypothesis 1. Highly 
educated employees within segments with a high price of 
control have a higher probability of achieving a high job 
level than those within segments with a low price of control. 
The analysis also shows that we can better predict the job 
level of employees within segments with a high price of 
control than we can for those within segments with a low price 
of control. Therefore we conclude that employers with a high 
price of control do find indicators of employee productivity 
more useful than employers with a low price of control. As a 
result, they hire more employees with high educational levels. 
 Section 3 of chapter 5 shows that although a simple 
empirical model for the entire labor market fits reasonably 
well it is not possible to show differences between employers. 
Some of the effects that we find for the labor market as a 
whole cannot or can only with great difficulty be interpreted. 
This finding gives further empirical support to the allocation 
model developed in chapter 3. 
 
In chapter 6 we test hypothesis 2 about effects of crowding 
out. Before hypothesis 2 was tested, we first examined whether 
crowding out within the entire labor market took place between 
1981 and 1985. The analysis shows that, despite a regradation 
of the job structure (relatively more high level jobs were 
available in 1985 than in 1981), the probability of achieving 
a high job level, given a certain educational level, decreased 
between 1981 and 1985. 
 Second we analyze the differences in allocation within the 
segments between 1981 and 1985. The analysis shows that 
crowding out did not take place within every segment. For two 
segments -- small competitive trade and services, and 
bureaucratic services -- the probability of achieving a high 
job level, given a certain educational level, actually 
increased between 1981 and 1985. Crowding out did not take 
place within these two segments, while an upwardly directed 
substitution process had been happening. 
 However, we do find effects of crowding out within three 
segments: 'classical' capitalistic industries, large scale 
bureaucratic industries, and professional services. Within the 
'classical' capitalistic industries crowding out results from 
the degradation of the job structure. Within the large scale 
bureaucratic industries, all employees are effected similarly 
by the crowding out process. Within professional services 
employees who work in low level jobs are most affected by the 
crowding out process. 
 Within two segments -- traditional primary industries, and 
competitive industries with schooled employees -- no 
differences are found in the probability of achieving a high 
job level between 1981 and 1985. 
 By and large these results support hypothesis 2. A change 
in the selection of personnel did take place, and especially 
for segments with a high price of control. The one exception 
to this trend is for bureaucratic services where contrary to 
our expectations the probability of achieving a high job level 
actually increased. 
 
In chapter 7 hypotheses 3a, 3b, 4 and 5 are tested. These 
hypotheses are tested in different steps. In the first step 
hypotheses 3a and 4 aere tested. Separate models of allocation 
over job levels are tested for men and women and their 
outcomes are compared. Then, an interaction between marital 
state and educational level was added. This interaction is 
added to the original empirical model in order to test 
hypothesis 4. For both men and women a positive effect of the 
interaction is expected. On basis of hypothesis 3a, it is 
expected that married men have a better position in the labor 
than non-married men, and will therefore benefit more from 
their educational level. On basis of hypothesis 4 a positive 
interaction effect is expected for women. This positive effect 
will result when highly educated women marry highly educated 
men more often than they marry men with lower educational 
levels. According to Dessens, Jansen and Ultee (1990) dutch 
women marry men who have a slightly higher educational level. 
 The results of the analysis show the same effects for the 
variables as the original analysis with men and women 
together. 
 Hypothesis 4 is fully supported by the results. Highly 
educated married women benefit more from their educational 
level than lowly educated married women and non-married women. 
Hypothesis 3a is only partially supported. Lowly educated 
women have a smaller probability of achieving a high job level 
than lowly educated men, but highly educated women have at 
least the same probability of achieving a high job level as 
highly educated men. 
 In the second step of the analysis hypothesis 3b is tested. 
Separate models are again estimated for men and women for each 
of the seven segments. In this step, the same variables are 
entered into the empirical model as in the first step. For 
men, the results here are comparable to those for men and 
women together. The results show few differences between the 
allocation of married and non-married men. This is contrary to 
hypothesis 3b. 
 For women, this model reveals even fewer differences in 
allocation between the segments than the model for men. The 
differences are in the direction of our expectations. In 
addition hypothesis 4 is supported by this analysis. It shows 
that married women benefit more from their educational level 
than non-married women, and this is especially so for women 
within bureaucratic services and professional services. 
Hypothesis 3b is partially confirmed in this analysis as well. 
The differences between non-married and married lowly educated 
women are bigger for those segments with a high price of 
control than for those segments with a low price of control. 
These differences are larger in 1981 than in 1985. 
 With respect to the differences in allocation between men 
and women within segments, hypothesis 3b is contradicted. We 
find differences in allocation between men and women, and 
these differences depend on the segment in which men and women 
work. However these differences are not related to the price 
of control of the segments. For instance, men have a higher 
probability of achieving a high job level than women both for 
segments with a low price of control (e.g. 'classical' 
capitalistic industries) and for segments with a high price of 
control (e.g. professional services). However women have a 
higher probability of achieving a high job level than men 
within the small competitive trade and services (a segment 
with a low price of control), and within large scale 
bureaucratic industries (a segment with a high price of 
control). 
 The lack of support for hypothesis 3b is partially due to 
hypothesis 4. We hypothesize that highly educated married 
women who work within professional services or bureaucratic 
services will value job status more than non-married women and 
lowly educated married women. Therefore it is to be expected 
that highly educated women are more likely to stop working 
completely if they cannot find a job with enough status. This 
effect is contrary to hypothesis 3b. As a result, the lack of 
support for hypothesis 3b gives no reason to reject this 
aspect of the allocation model yet. 
 In the third and final step of the analysis hypothesis 5 is 
tested. As in chapter 6 we first examine whether crowding out 
occurred in the entire labor market for men as well as for 
women. 
 While crowding out seems to have occurred for both men and 
women, the effect is different. According to hypothesis 5, 
crowding out is more extreme for men than for women. The 
probability of achieving a high job level, given a certain 
educational level, decreased more for men than for women. 
 Separate analyses for each segment show that changes in the 
allocation of men and women between 1981 and 1985 is 
especially apparent for segments with a high price of control. 
In addition crowding out appears to be more extensive for men 
than for women. These results support hypothesis 5. Also in 
line with hypothesis 5 is the finding that there were no 
differences in effects of crowding out between married and 
non-married women. However, contrary to hypothesis 5 there 
appear to be no differences in effects of crowding out between 
married and non-married men. 
 In addition to crowding out, we also find some proof for 
upwardly directed substitution. Substitution mainly appears 
within segments with a low price of control. 
 
 
(English corrected by Dr. R. Settersten) 
 
